IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH

ANDREW HOAN, an individual,

Case No. 22CV23479

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Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

MARY HULL CABALLERO, City of Portland Auditor, LOUISE HANSEN, City of Portland Elections Officer.

Oral Argument Requested

Defendants.

UTCR 5.050 STATEMENT

Plaintiff Andrew Hoan ("Hoan") requests oral argument, which the Court set for August 11. Estimated time is 60 minutes. Hoan requests official court reporting services.

MOTION

Pursuant to ORCP 47, and under the briefing schedule agreed by the parties and the Court, Hoan moves for summary judgment on his first claim for relief that Defendants failed to follow their constitutional duty to reject the Charter Commission's proposed ballot measure for violating the single-subject protection.

This motion is supported by the court's entire record, Hoan's Complaint, the Declaration of Andrew Hoan filed in support of this motion ("Hoan Decl."), the Declaration of Steve Elzinga filed in support of this motion ("Elzinga Decl."), and the points and authorities below.

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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

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Expedited review of this matter, agreed to by all parties, allows time for the City to refer multiple single-subject ballot measures to voters this November. Doing so protects voters' constitutional right to evaluate each reform on its own merits. This increases the likelihood for at least some reform by increasing the number of voter choices and allowing for each element of proposed change to be clear, uncomplex, and transparent to voters.

The City of Portland ("City") Charter Commission ("Commission") has spent months evaluating numerous possible reforms to improve city government. Plaintiff Andrew Hoan is a registered Portland voter who, like many Portland voters, supports many of the Commission's proposed reforms, including restructuring City management to increase accountability and performance, an expanded council, and a move to district representation. However, Hoan is undecided on several other reforms the Commission has proposed, such as selecting City councilors through an unprecedented system of three-member (multimember) districts using single transferrable ranked choice voting that allows councilors to assume power after receiving only 25% of the vote (or less).

Rather than sending the voters multiple ballot measures to allow voters the final say in determining which of these very different reforms to adopt or reject, the Commission seeks to proceed in a highly unusual way, placing political expedience over constitutional compliance. The Commission proposed a single ballot measure bundling a vast and novel package of different subjects that are logically unconnected. The Commission is upfront that they want to force voters to accept all or nothing because they are concerned that voters might reject some of the individual reforms included in the

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package if standing alone. This is precisely the kind of manipulative political shenanigan Oregon's constitutional single-subject protection for ballot measures is designed to avoid. The Commission's effort to bundle multiple subjects in hopes of forcing acceptance of otherwise potentially unpalatable reforms violates voter rights and risks defeat of the widely supported parts of the reform package.

The Auditor and City Elections Officer ("Defendants") are constitutionally charged with protecting voting rights by reviewing proposed ballot measures for compliance with the single-subject protection. In 2020, Defendants rejected a similar but narrower—proposed ballot measure for noncompliance with the single-subject protection because "changing the operations of City Council is not logically connected to changing the voting system for all elected City officials." Based on Defendants' own (correct) analysis, they should have rejected the Commission's even broader proposed ballot measure.

In response to a letter requesting that Defendants follow their constitutional duty, Defendants claimed—contrary to almost a century of precedent and their own prior actions—that they have no authority to review and reject the Commission's proposed ballot measure. Defendants are incorrect. If Defendants are allowed to refuse to exercise their previously admitted authority, then voters will be denied their right to pick and choose those reforms they support guaranteed by the Oregon Constitution.

This case is about protecting voter choices. This case is not about the merits of any particular reform concept. Hoan fully supports the City referring to voters all the Commission's reform concepts this November in line with the policy intent of the Commission as multiple single-subject ballot measures. He even advocated for a highly expedited briefing schedule to make this possible. Defendants agreed for similar reasons.

Hoan now asks the Court to protect voter choices by determining that the Commission's catchall proposed ballot measure is not consistent with the constitutional single-subject protection.

II. **UNDISPUTED FACTS**

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On December 16, 2020, the City Elections Officer rejected Prospective Initiative Petition ID 2020-PDX01 ("2020-PDX01") for constitutional insufficiency. Elzinga Decl.,

¶ 2, Ex. 1 (2020-PDX01 determination letter). The City Elections Officer stated:

Failure to Embrace One Subject Only

Article IV, section 1 (2)(d) requires that a proposed law "shall embrace one subject only and matters properly connected therewith." A two-part framework governs the determination of whether a proposed law comports with the singlesubject requirement. First, is there a unifying principle logically connecting all provisions in the measure? Second, if a unifying principle exists, are other matters in the proposed law properly connected to the unifying principle? Here, 2020-PDX01 seeks to, most relevantly:

- Increase the number of City Council members.
- Require mandatory town hall meetings, in addition to weekly Council meetings.
- Change Council voting requirements.
- Change Council member qualifications.
- Change the management structure of internal bureaus.
- Change term durations of City Council members.
- Change frequency of elections.
- Change at-large elections to district elections.
- Change the voting system from a simple majority to ranked-choice voting.
- Create elective council districts and a district map.

2020-PDX01 does not comply with the first part of the single-subject analytic framework because it seeks to amend multiple provisions of the City Charter, and not all the amendments are connected by a single unifying purpose. For example, changing the operations of City Council is not logically connected to changing the voting system for all elected City officials.

Id. (bold in original; strikethrough added for single element from 2020 measure that is not also in 2022 proposal; underlining added for emphasis).

Less than a year and one-half later, on June 21, 2022, sixteen members of the Commission voted to combine numerous major charter reforms into a single proposed

Two members abstained, and two were absent. <i>Id</i> .		
The proposed ballot measure is extensive. It amends 104 charter sections, replaces		
one charter section, adds seven charter sections,	and deletes two charter sections. $Id.$, \P 4,	
Ex. 3 (Auditor Report). The Auditor's report sur	mmarizes changes as follows:	
• Amend Charter Section 1-104	• Amend Charter Section 2-601	
 Amend Charter Section 1-106 	 Amend Charter Section 2-602 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-101 	 Amend Charter Section 2-603 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-102 	 Amend Charter Section 2-604 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-103 	 Amend Charter Section 2-606 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-104 	 Amend Charter Section 2-611 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-105 	 Amend Charter Section 2-701 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-106 	 Amend Charter Section 2-801 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-108 	 Amend Charter Section 2-802 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-109 	 Amend Charter Section 2-1006 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-110 	 Amend Charter Section 3-101 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-111 	• Replace Charter Section 3-102	
 Amend Charter Section 2-112 	• Amend Charter Section 3-105	
 Amend Charter Section 2-113 	 Add Charter Section 3-107 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-114 	 Add Charter Section 3-108 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-117 	 Add Charter Section 3-109 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-120 	 Add Charter Section 3-110 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-124 	 Amend Charter Section 3-201 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-125 	 Amend Charter Section 4-301 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-126 	 Amend Charter Section 5-102 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-127 	 Amend Charter Section 5-103 	
 Add Charter Section 2-128 	 Amend Charter Section 5-202 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-201 	 Amend Charter Section 5-403 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-202 	 Amend Charter Section 7-101 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-206 	 Amend Charter Section 7-102 	
 Add Charter Section 2-207 	 Amend Charter Section 7-103 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-301 	 Amend Charter Section 7-104 	
 Delete Charter Section 2-302 	 Amend Charter Section 7-105 	
 Delete Charter Section 2-303 	 Amend Charter Section 7-108 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-304 	 Amend Charter Section 7-109 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-401 	 Amend Charter Section 7-111 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-404 	 Amend Charter Section 7-113 	
 Add Charter Section 2-406 	 Amend Charter Section 7-202 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-502 	 Amend Charter Section 8-101 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-503 	 Amend Charter Section 8-102 	
 Amend Charter Section 2-504 	 Amend Charter Section 8-104 	
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ballot measure for the November 2020 election. *Id.*, ¶ 3, Ex. 2 (Commission minutes).

• Amend Charter Section 8-105

• Amend Charter Section 2-508

 Amend Charter Section 8-106 	 Amend Charter Section 10-210
 Amend Charter Section 9-103 	 Amend Charter Section 10-212
 Amend Charter Section 9-105 	 Amend Charter Section 10-215
 Amend Charter Section 9-203 	 Amend Charter Section 10-218
 Amend Charter Section 9-302 	 Amend Charter Section 11-101
 Amend Charter Section 9-304 	 Amend Charter Section 11-102
 Amend Charter Section 9-305 	 Amend Charter Section 11-106
 Amend Charter Section 9-406 	 Amend Charter Section 11-201
 Amend Charter Section 9-407 	 Amend Charter Section 11-301
 Amend Charter Section 9-502 	 Amend Charter Section 11-302
 Amend Charter Section 9-601 	 Amend Charter Section 11-303
 Amend Charter Section 9-602 	 Amend Charter Section 12-101
 Amend Charter Section 9-704 	 Amend Charter Section 12-102
 Amend Charter Section 10-104 	 Amend Charter Section 12-301
 Amend Charter Section 10-107 	 Amend Charter Section 12-302
 Amend Charter Section 10-108 	 Amend Charter Section 13-101
 Amend Charter Section 10-203 	 Amend Charter Section 13-201
 Amend Charter Section 10-204 	 Amend Charter Section 13-301
 Amend Charter Section 10-207 	 Amend Charter Section 15-104
 Amend Charter Section 10-209 	 Amend Charter Section 15-105

Id., Ex. 3 (original report has only one column).

An immediate effective date applies to four added sections, one replaced section, and three amended sections. 1 Id., ¶ 5, Ex. 4 (proposed measure text). All remaining changes take effect on January 1, 2025. Id. The text is 185 pages long. Id.

Unfortunately, the Commission ignored the City Attorney's caution that Portland historically ensured "that ballot measures referred to voters by the Portland City Council or by the Portland Charter Commission meet the full-text and single-subject requirements." Id., ¶ 6, Ex. 5 (Memo from City Attorney). Instead, the Commission was upfront that they want to force voters to accept all or nothing because they believe that a single measure has a greater chance to pass than individual measures. Id., ¶ 7, Ex. 6, p. 20 (Commission report). The Commission strongly implied concern that voters might reject

¹ Sections 2-202; 2-207; 3-101; 3-102; 3-105; 3-108; 3-109; and 3-110.

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at least one of the individual reforms included in the package if it was a stand-alone ballot measure. Id. One Commission member went even further in stating:

I'm a little bit surprised when I've heard from some folks who, if that's their priority, they don't actually want to hitch their wagon to the other more popular stars . . . because if you look at the polling, remember the FM3 polling showed form of government—the mayor-council—starting off at 51 [percent support] . . . politically, if we want, you know, if there are folks on the commission or in the public who prefer one over the other it just makes sense to put them all together.

Video of Charter Commission Work Session (Hybrid) (June 6, 2022),

https://www.portland.gov/omf/charter-review-commission/events/2022/6/6/chartercommission-work-session-hybrid (video at 2:33:18 to 2:33:28). Another Commission member disagreed: "I think we should let people choose what they want our government to look like rather than us 20 people deciding that its either our way or the highway by having it be one ballot measure rather than separating it and letting people have a choice." Id. (video at 2:35:14 to 2:35:29).

The Commission's own report acknowledges that their proposed ballot measure includes at least three "major changes, including:

- Allowing voters to rank candidates in order of their preference, using ranked choice voting....
- Four new geographic districts with three members elected to represent each district, expanding the city council to a total of 12 members. . . .
- A city council that focuses on setting policy and a mayor elected citywide to run the city's day-to-day operations, with the help of a professional city administrator. . . . ,,

Id. p. 3 (bolding removed). However, the extensive package of reforms is far broader and includes all the following elements:

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City Structure

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- Change the division of power between Council and the Mayor (Sections 2-101, 2-103, 2-104, 2-105, 2-106, 2-108, 2-109, 2-126, 2-128, 2-304, 2-401, 2-604, 8-101, 9-502)
- Increase the number of Council members (Section 2-102)
- Change Council leadership (Section 2-110)
- Change Council procedures (Sections 2-111, 2-113, 2-114, 2-117, 2-120, 2-124, 2-127)
- Change Council meeting frequency requirements (Section 2-112)
- Change term durations of Council members, including retroactively shortening term durations mid-term for commissioners elected for four years in the November 2022 election (Section 3-101)
- o Change Council voting requirements, including minimum thresholds for various types of votes (Sections 1-104, 10-207, 10-218)
- Limit the Mayor's vote on City Council only to tiebreaking (Section 2-401)
- Change Council member qualifications (Section 2-202)
- Chang the process for filling vacancies, including eliminating mid-cycle special elections and elevating the mayor's chief of staff to fill a vacancy in the office of Mayor instead of a Councilor in an emergency (Section 2-206)
- Create a new Independent District Commission (Section 3-108)
- Create a new Salary Commission (Section 2-207)
- Change the process for appointing future Charter Commission members (Section 13-301)

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Other Changes (Sections 2-404, 2-502, 2-503, 2-504, 2-508, 2-606, 2-701, 2-1006, 13-101, 13-201, 15-104, 15-105)

Management and Administration

- Change the management structure of internal bureaus (Sections 2-301; 2-302 repeal, 2-303 repeal, 2-602, 2-603)
- o Create a new City Administrator position appointed by the Mayor, subject to Council confirmation (Section 2-406)
- Require City Attorney and Chief of Police to by appointed by Mayor, subject to Council approval (Section 2-601)
- Require City Administrator to prescribe rules and regulations (Section 2-406)
- Require Mayor to "[a]uthorize, negotiate and execute all contracts and intergovernmental agreements, consistent with the City budget." (Section 2-401)
- Increase authority of Mayor to settle claims from \$5,000 to \$50,000 (Section 1-106)
- Require Mayor and City Administrator to submit a proposed annual budget by May 5, and periodic amendments (Sections 2-128, 2-401)
- Require Mayor to "[a]nnually, appear before the Council to deliver a general address on the State of the City." (Section 2-401)
- Require the City to undertake periodic education campaigns on the new voting structure (Section 3-102)
- Other changes (Sections 2-611, 2-801, 2-802, 4-301, 5-102, 5-103, 5-202, 5-403, 7-101, 7-102, 7-103, 7-104, 7-105, 7-108, 7-109, 7-111, 7-113, 7-202, 8-101, 8-102, 8-104, 8-105, 8-106, 9-103, 9-105, 9-203, 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, 9-406, 9-407, 9-601, 9-602, 9-704, 9-806, 10-104, 10-107, 10-108, 10-203, 10-204, 10-209, 10-

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	210, 10-212, 10-215, 11-101, 11-102, 11-106, 11-201, 11-301, 11-302, 11-303
	12-101, 12-102, 12-301, 12-302)
El	ection Processes and Methods
0	Change at-large elections to district elections (Sections 2-102, 2-201)
0	Require multi-member council districts (Section 3-107)

- Change the voting system from a simple majority to ranked-choice voting (Section 3-102)
- Eliminate primary elections (Section 3-105)
- Require ranked-choice voting method for Mayor and Auditor (Section 3-102)
- Require single transferrable voting method for councilors (Section 3-102)
- Create elective council districts and a district map (Section 3-109)
- Require periodic redistricting and set restricting process and criteria (Sections 3-108, 3-109, 3-110)
- Change frequency of elections (Sections 3-105, 2-206)
- Other changes (Sections 3-201, 3-308)

Setting Values and Policies

- Require Mayor and City Administrator to "[a]dvance the City's core values antiracism, equity, transparency, communication, collaboration and fiscal responsibility." (Section 2-401)
- Require Mayor and City Administrator to "[a]dvance the City's efforts to mitigate the human-made climate crisis and prioritize environmental justice initiatives." (Section 2-401)
- Require Mayor to "[e]ncourage programs for the physical, economic, social and cultural development of the City." (Section 2-401)

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Require Mayor to "[a]ctively promote economic development to broaden and strengthen the commercial and employment base of the City." (Section 2-401) *Id.*, ¶ 5, Ex. 4 (Proposed ballot measure text).

On July 8, 2022, Hoan's attorney sent Defendants a letter regarding how the Charter Commission's proposed measure unconstitutionally combines multiple subjects like 2020-PDX01 and asking that the proposed measure be rejected. *Id.*, ¶ 8, Ex. 7 (Letter to Defendants).

On July 12, 2022, Defendants determined that they would not reject the City of Portland Charter Commission proposed measure. Id., ¶ 9, Ex. 8 (Letter from Defendants).²

On July 14, 2022, Hoan filed this action to challenge Defendants' decision under ORS 246.910. Complaint. Although Defendants originally proposed completing briefing by August 22, Hoan pushed for faster schedule to allow sufficient time for the City to refer to voters all the Commission's reform concepts this November in line with the intent of the Commission as multiple single-subject ballot measures. *Id.*, ¶ 10.

Hoan is a registered Portland voter who resides in Multnomah County. Hoan Decl., ¶ 2. Hoan supports many of the Commission's proposed reforms, including restructuring City management to increase accountability and performance, an expanded council, and a move to district representation. *Id.*, ¶ 3. However, Hoan is undecided on several other reforms the Commission has proposed, such as selecting City councilors through an unprecedented system of three-member (multimember) districts using single transferrable ranked choice voting that allows councilors to assume power after receiving only 25% of the vote (or less). Id., ¶ 4.

² The Auditor's office is located in Multnomah County. *Id.*, ¶ 9, Ex. 8.

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Hoan believes many other Portland voters also support core elements of the Commission's proposed reforms but not the whole package. *Id.*, ¶ 5. Examples abound, so here are just two: Current City Commissioner Mingas Mapps was quoted in the Willamette Week as taking a similar position:

"When I look at this package, I see four, if not more, major reforms packed into this proposal. Some of these ideas I clearly support, some I have questions about, some I think are probably bad ideas," Mapps says. "Portlanders at least need to have a chance to vote on these ideas separately. Packing them all together literally makes it impossible for me to sort out whether this is going to help the city more or hurt."

Mapps tells WW there are parts of the measure he thinks are "bad ideas." He is especially concerned by multi-member districts. "As you layer on these complications after complications...I think it actually might make our government less functional."

Sophie Peel, Willamette Week, Two Political Action Committees Plan to Push Back Against Portland Charter Reform Ballot Measure: One of them is a PAC launched by Commissioner Mingus Mapps last fall explicitly to support charter reform (June 28, 2022) https://www.wweek.com/news/city/2022/06/28/two-political-action-committeesplan-to-push-back-against-portland-charter-reform-ballot-measure/ (emphasis added). Similarly, the Oregonian recently received a letter to the editor, from someone who rarely agrees with the organization Hoan leads, stating:

... I can't follow the logic of the three proposals being so closely interdependent that they cannot be pulled apart into separate measures. And I am troubled by the concept that they can't trust the voters to choose between the three ideas and find our own version of the way we want our city to be run.

As someone who desperately wants a change in the commission form of government, I fear that the whole thing will go down in flames because of the complexity of what we're being asked to agree to and the controversy it's already generated. []

Please trust Portland voters to be the engaged, adult citizens who we are and allow us to support one, two or all three of the proposed changes as we see fit. I think it's sad that this must go to courts to get settled, and though I rarely agree with the PBA, this time I'm glad they are bringing a suit to allow this decision the discussion it needs.

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Mary Anne Cassin, The Oregonian, Readers respond: Pull charter proposals apart (July 22, 2022), https://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/2022/07/readers-respond-pull-charterproposals-apart.html (internal links omitted).

Like others, Hoan is concerned that the coupling of the Commission's good and expected reforms will be brought down at the ballot by the improvised concepts advanced through the new form of elections that the Commission bundled together into a single proposed measure. Hoan Decl., ¶ 6. Hoan is aware of strong and organized opposition to the experimental election proposals within the Commission's proposed measure, but sees no such strong or organized opposition to the good reforms to the City's administration within the Commission's proposed measure. *Id.*, ¶ 7. Hoan wants the City to re-submit the same charter reforms to voters in multiple measures so that Portland's voters have the choice to agree with all, none, or some of the charter reforms. Id., ¶ 8.

III. **ARGUMENT**

- The Commission's proposed ballot measure violates the single-subject protection by bundling various logically unrelated subjects and forcing voters to take all or nothing instead of giving voters full control.
 - a. The single-subject protection ensures voters have the opportunity to evaluate every proposed ballot measure on its own merits.

The single-subject protection "was designed to do away with the several abuses." Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Phillips, 302 Or. 87, 95, 727 P.2d 602, 606 (1986) (quoting Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or. 459, 188 P. 207 (1920)). It serves multiple important purposes in protecting voters.

First, the protection prevents bundling unrelated policies and forcing voters to choose all or nothing. A single measure may not combine "incongruous matters and

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objects totally distinct and having no connection nor relation with each other." State ex rel. Caleb v. Beesley, 326 Or. 83, 90, 949 P.2d 724, 728 (1997) (citations omitted).

Second, the protection prevents forcing voters to accept poison pills to see desired change through "logrolling." The single-subject protection prevents measure proponents from "combining subjects representing diverse interests, in order to unite [voters] who favored either, in support of all." Nielson v. Bryson, 257 Or. 179, 186, 477 P.2d 714, 717 (1970) (quoting State v. Shaw, 22 Or. 287, 288, 29 P. 1028, 1028 (1892)). Logrolling also prevents including in one measure "two or more unrelated provisions so that those favoring one provision could be compelled, in order to secure its adoption, to combine with those favoring another provision." State v. Mercer, 269 Or. App. 135, 138, 344 P.3d 109, 111–12 (2015) (citations omitted). Notably, "by this process of log-rolling the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished, when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits." Id. To prevent "logrolling or hodgepodge" measures, the single-subject protection discourages policy combinations designed to "secure support for a bill of an omnibus nature, with discordant riders attached, which, if acted upon singly, would neither merit nor receive sufficient support to secure their adoption." N. Ctys. Inv. Tr. v. Sears, 30 Or. 388, 400–01, 41 P. 931, 935 (1895).

Third, the protection discourages "concealing" from the voters "the true nature" of what is in a measure. See Oregon Educ. Ass'n, 302 Or. at 95 (citation omitted). The Commission's proposed all-or-nothing ballot measure commits all three transgressions and violates voter rights.

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b. The single-subject protection safeguards voters.

The single-subject protection is repeated in two state constitutional provisions:

- (1) "Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith," Art. IV, § 20, and
- (2) "A proposed law or amendment to the Constitution shall embrace one subject only and matters properly connected therewith," Art. IV, § 1(2)(d).

Courts give both provisions the same meaning. Oregon Educ. Ass'n, 302 Or. at 100.

The City has a similar single-subject protection in its charter: "No ordinance, except one making an appropriation, shall contain more than one general subject; ordinances making appropriations shall be confined to the subject of appropriations." Portland Charter Section 2-118.

The single-subject protection prohibits a measure "from combining in one act subjects wholly incongruous, diverse in their nature, and having no perceptible or necessary connection with each other." Spaulding Logging Co. v. Indep. Imp. Co., 42 Or. 394, 397, 71 P. 132, 133 (1903). "A measure must first be scrutinized to determine whether it embraces more than one subject. If it does, it offends the constitutional limitation even if the subjects are 'properly connected,' and that is the end of the inquiry." *Oregon Educ. Ass'n*, 302 Or. at 100.

A "subject" is given a broad meaning to give measure drafters "full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection." Anantha v. Clarno, 302 Or. App. 196, 201, 461 P.3d 282, 285 (2020) (citing Lovejoy, 95 Or. at 466). Although a ballot measure may have a comprehensive subject, for the ballot measure to "embrace one subject, there must be a unifying principle, referred to variously as 'one

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general subject,' 'one general object,' 'one general idea,' or 'the object in view' . . . [and] there must exist among its parts some logical connection relating each to the others."³ McIntire v. Forbes, 322 Or. 426, 443, 909 P.2d 846, 856 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or. 471, 486, 145 P.3d 139 (2006).4

For example, a law that violated the single-subject protection included eight topics: "(1) provides state funding and land use procedures for light rail, (2) expands the availability of card-lock service stations, (3) promotes 'regional problem solving' in land use matters, (4) regulates confined animal feeding, (5) preempts local pesticide regulation, (6) adopts new timber harvesting rules, (7) grants immunity to shooting ranges for noise pollution, and (8) protects salmon from cormorants." *McIntire*, 322 Or. at 444 (internal brackets and quotes removed).

In *McIntire*, advocates for the law argued that a proposed subject—activities already regulated by state government and not including activities regulated by local government—was sufficient. McIntire, 322 Or. at 445–46. However, the court found that this was too "broad and general" to constitute a single subject since it "logically connects all provisions in the Act only in the meaningless sense that it announces a connection among nearly all things in the legislative universe." *McIntire*, 322 Or. at 445–46.

On the other hand, a ballot measure did not violate the single-subject protection when it had a subject of "enhanced punishments for offenders repeatedly convicted of specified crimes" because that "subject identifies (1) the precise sphere of regulation (namely, the criminal justice system); (2) the targeted persons (repeat offenders); and (3)

³ "One general subject" is identical to the language in Portland Charter Section 2-118.

⁴ Kellas abrogated McIntire on the issue of constitutional justiciability, which is entirely unrelated to McIntire's import in the current case. See Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or. 460, 514-15, 355 P.3d 866, 898 (2015).

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the intended outcome (enhanced punishments) . . . [and] is not so 'global' as the proposed unifying principle rejected in *McIntire*." *Mercer*, 269 Or. App. at 141–42.

Here, as in *McIntire*, the sole supposedly unifying principal seems to be issues related to governing the City. As in *McIntire*, this amounts to "announc[ing] a connection among nearly all things in the [City's] legislative universe," a standard rejected by the Oregon Supreme Court as far too broad. McIntire, 322 Or. at 445.

c. Under Defendants' own (correct) reasoning, the Commission's proposed ballot measure violates the single-subject protection.

The Commission's proposed ballot measure includes all but one of the key elements from rejected 2020-PDX01:

- Increase the number of City Council members.
- Require mandatory town hall meetings, in addition to weekly Council meetings.
- Change Council voting requirements.
- Change Council member qualifications.
- Change the management structure of internal bureaus.
- Change term durations of City Council members.
- Change frequency of elections.
- Change at-large elections to district elections.
- Change the voting system from a simple majority to ranked-choice voting.
- Create elective council districts and a district map.

(direct quote from City Elections Officer, except strikethrough added for single element from 2020 measure that is not also in 2022 proposal). The Commission's proposal is even more expansive and includes many additional key elements, such as creating new City policy on addressing climate change in the Charter.

Just like with Defendants' reasoning in 2020-PDX01, the Commission's proposal for "changing the operations of City Council is not logically connected to changing the voting system for all elected City officials." Through their decision in 2020-PDX01, Defendants also implicitly recognized that the Oregon Supreme Court's development of single-subject case law over the past century (especially *McIntire*) has effectively

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abrogated the centenarian case of State ex rel. Duniway v. City of Portland, 65 Or. 273, 281–83, 133 P. 62, 65 (1913).⁵

d. The Commission itself admits it combined at least three different "major changes" to try to pass the measure due to concern that at least one major change could not pass on its own.

The Commission "combin[ed] subjects representing diverse interests, in order to unite [voters] who favored either, in support of all." Nielson v. Bryson, 257 Or. 179, 186, 477 P.2d 714, 717 (1970) (citation omitted).

Most damningly, the Commission itself admitted that the Commission wanted to force voters to accept all major changes or nothing because the Commission was concerned that voters might reject at least one of the major individual reforms standing alone. This is the very definition of logrolling that the single-subject protection is designed to prevent.

The Commission's own report acknowledges that their proposed ballot measure includes at least three "major changes," including ranked choice voting, multimember districts, and City management changes. The Commission's use of different effective dates for different section changes further shows that all the provisions are not inseparably interconnected.

e. The Commission's proposed ballot measure bundles a cacophony of provisions in at least four distinct and logically unrelated categories.

The following chart summarizes the key elements from the Commission's proposed measure that (1) align with the 2020 measure (italicized) and (2) those that are additional (regular text).

⁵ The *Duniway* decision did not reference either Art. IV, § 20 nor any cases citing that provision. It noted that the authorities it considered related to "the issuance of municipal bonds or creating municipal indebtedness, and each case cited turns upon some statutory or constitutional provision not found in this state." Id., 65 Or. at 282.

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2	City Structure	Management and	Election	Setting Values
		Administration	Methods	and Policies
3	 Change the division of 	• Change the	• Change at-	 Require Mayor
	power between Council	management structure	large elections	and City
4	and the Mayor	of internal bureaus	to district	Administrator
ا ہ	Increase the number of	 Create a new City 	elections	to "[a]dvance
5	Council members	Administrator position	• Require multi-	the City's core
	Change Council	appointed by the	member	values anti-
6	leadership	Mayor, subject to	Council	racism, equity,
7	Change Council	Council confirmation	districts	transparency,
/	procedures	• Require City Attorney	• Change the	communication,
8	 Change Council meeting 	and Chief of Police to	voting system	collaboration
0	frequency requirements	by appointed by	from a simple	and fiscal
9	• Change term durations of	Mayor, subject to	majority to	responsibility."
,	Council members,	Council approval	ranked-choice	• Require Mayor
10	including shortening term	• Require City	voting	and City
	durations mid-term for	Administrator to	• Eliminate	Administrator
11	some Commissioners	prescribe rules and	primary	to "[a]dvance the City's
	• Change Council voting	regulations	elections	efforts to
12	requirements, including	• Require Mayor to	• Require	mitigate the
	minimum thresholds for	"[a]uthorize, negotiate and execute all	ranked-choice	human-made
13	various types of votes		voting method	climate crisis
	• Limit the Mayor's vote	contracts and	for Mayor and Auditor	and prioritize
14	on Council only to	intergovernmental agreements, consistent	• Require single	environmental
	tiebreaking	with the City budget."	transferrable	justice
15	• Change Council member	• Increase authority of	voting method	initiatives."
	qualifications	Mayor to settle claims	for councilors	• Require Mayor
16	• Chang the process for	from \$5,000 to	• Create	to "[e]ncourage
	filling vacancies,	\$50,000	elective	programs for
17	including eliminating mid-cycle special	• Require the City to	council	the physical,
	elections and elevating	undertake periodic	districts and a	economic,
18	the mayor's chief of staff	education campaigns	district map	social and
10	to fill a vacancy in the	on the new voting	• Require	cultural
19	office of Mayor instead	structure	periodic	development of
20	of a Councilor in an	 Require Mayor and 	redistricting	the City."
20	emergency	City Administrator to	and set	 Require Mayor
21	• Create a new Independent	submit a proposed	restricting	to "[a]ctively
41	District Commission	annual budget, and	process and	promote
22	• Create a new Salary	periodic amendments	criteria	economic
<i></i>	Commission	 Require Mayor to 	• Change	development to
23	 Change the process for 	annually "appear	frequency of	broaden and
	appointing future Charter	before the Council to	elections	strengthen the
24	Commission members	deliver a general	Other changes	commercial and
				employment

Other Changes	address on the State of	base of the
	the City."	City."
	• Other changes	

While a few of the key elements in the bullet points above might fit under multiple subjects—such as some overlap between structure and management—no single subject covers all key elements. For example, (1) setting values and priorities on climate change and anti-racism cannot fit under "structure;" (2) eliminating primaries, adopting multi-member districts, and using the single transferrable vote system cannot fit under "administration;" (3) adding a new salary commission cannot fit under "elections methods;" and (4) increasing the Mayor's authority to settle claims from \$5,000 to \$50,000 is not part of "structure." There is no possible "subject" that encompasses all key elements in the Commission's proposed ballot measure without being too "global." *Mercer*, 269 Or. App. at 141–42.

OPB quoted one Commission member as stating that the proposed ballot measure's subject was "changing the structure of the city government." Rebecca Ellis, OPB, *Portland mayor and commissioner raise doubts about proposed charter changes* (June 29, 2022), https://www.opb.org/article/2022/06/29/portland-oregon-government-charter-november-ballot/ Several advocates for the proposed ballot measure, who filed a ballot title challenge on this proposed measure and are represented by the same attorney representing amicus in this matter, stated in a footnote that they believed the subject was "reforming Portland's governmental structure to make it more effective, responsive, and democratically accountable." Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review of Ballot Title, Wilson v. Taylor, Case No. 22CV23601 (July 15, 2022). Like the single-subject violation in *McIntire*, both proposed subjects are too "broad and general" to constitute a single subject since each "logically connects all provisions in the [proposed ballot

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measure] only in the meaningless sense that it announces a connection among nearly all things in the [municipal] legislative universe." *McIntire*, 322 Or. at 445–46.

Here are a few hypothetical examples of other reforms—mirroring the eight found unconstitutional in *McIntire*—that would "fit" within these global and unreasonably broad so-called "subjects" at least as well—or better than—some changes already in the currently proposed ballot measure:

- Require a minimum amount of City "funding for . . . light rail" each year;
- Create new "land use procedures for light rail" to allow more democratic participation in the comment process;
- Create a streamlined approval process that "expands the availability of cardlock service stations;"
- Create an independent commission that "promotes 'regional problem solving' in land use matters;"
- Create an independent commission that "regulates confined animal feeding;"
- Create a duty for the Mayor to advance the City's efforts to secure new "local pesticide regulation;"
- Create a duty for the City Manager to "adopt[] new timber harvesting rules" through a transparent process that is responsive to public input;
- Prohibit City ordinances "grant[ing] immunity to shooting ranges for noise pollution;" and
- Create a duty for the Mayor to encourage programs to "protect[] salmon from cormorants."

Mercer, 269 Or. App. at 141–42 (*quoting McIntire*, 322 Or. at 443).

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Such extensive log rolling was rejected in McIntire, and should be rejected here where even more and bigger policies are bundled together, and there is no dispute, intended to force voters to accept provisions they dislike or reject much-needed reforms altogether.

- 2. "The initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people" include the single-subject protection that applies to the Commission's proposed ballot measure.
 - a. The text of the single-subject protection applies broadly.

The single-subject protection applies to "Every Act," Art. IV, § 20, and any "proposed law," Art. IV, § 1(2)(d). Further, Art. IV, § 1(5) says "[t]he initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by subsections (2) and (3) of this section are further reserved to the qualified voters of each municipality and district as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in or for their municipality or district" (emphasis added). The broad language establishing the sweeping scope of the applicability of the single-subject protection leaves no room for the exception asserted by the Commission.

b. The single-subject protection has always applied to both initiative and referendum measures, including referrals.

Courts have applied the single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 20 to both initiatives and referendum, including referrals, since the inception of the initiative and referendum powers. State ex rel. Gibson v. Richardson, 48 Or. 309, 318–19, 85 P. 225,

⁶ Art. XI, § 2 similarly says "The Legislative Assembly shall not enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city or town. The legal voters of every city and town are hereby granted power to enact and amend their municipal charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal laws of the State of Oregon." (emphasis added). This wording limits the state legislature's ability to interfere with city home rule, but it does not exempt cities from other state constitutional requirements. Nothing in this provision changes application of the single-subject protection to municipal legislation under Art. IV, §§ 1 and 20.

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229 (1906) (applying to initiative); Turnidge v. Thompson, 89 Or. 637, 651, 175 P. 281, 285–86 (1918) (same); State ex rel. Umatilla Cnty. v. Hawks, 110 Or. 497, 502–03, 222 P. 1071, 1073 (1924) (applying to referendum ordered by referral); State v. Putney, 110 Or. 634, 646–47, 224 P. 279, 283–84 (1924) (same).

In 1906, the state initiative and referendum rights first "reserved to the people" in 1902 were extended to the "voters of every municipality." Long v. City of Portland, 53 Or. 92, 94–96, 98 P. 149, 150–51 (1908), aff'd, 53 Or. 92, 98 P. 1111 (1909) (noting that the "right of the referendum is reserved to the people of a city or town, regardless of any provisions of the city charter. It is superior to the charter.").

Oregon voters reorganized the sections setting out initiative and referendum powers in 1968, adding a second reiteration of the single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 1(2)(d) consistent with Art. IV, § 20, without reducing any of the prior referendum and initiatives rights. *Harisay v. Clarno*, 367 Or. 116, 124–25, 474 P.3d 378, 382–83 (2020) (citation omitted); see also Oregon Educ. Ass'n, 302 Or. at 99–100 (before "1968, this court had ruled that [Art. IV,] section 20 was just as applicable to initiative measures as it was to those adopted by the legislature."). All this is on top of the City charter's singlesubject protection. Again, well established case law leaves no room to read the application of the single-subject protection narrowly to make room for the exception asserted by the Commission.

c. The single-subject protection applies to both types of referendum referendum by petition and referendum by referral.

"There are two types of referenda: the citizen referendum and the legislative referendum." Am. Energy, Inc. v. City of Sisters, 250 Or. App. 243, 247–48, 280 P.3d

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985, 987 (2012). What the Commission and Defendants call a "referral" is really a legislative referendum, also known as a referendum by referral.

Art. IV, § 1(3) sets this out clearly. The referendum power includes referendum by petition in subsection (b) and referendum by referral in subsection (c):

- (3)(a) The people reserve to themselves the referendum power, which is to approve or reject at an election any Act, or part thereof, of the Legislative Assembly that does not become effective earlier than 90 days after the end of the session at which the Act is passed.
- (b) A referendum on an Act or part thereof may be ordered by a petition signed by a number of qualified voters equal to four percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the election at which a Governor was elected for a term of four years next preceding the filing of the petition. A referendum petition shall be filed not more than 90 days after the end of the session at which the Act is passed.
- (c) A referendum on an Act may be ordered by the Legislative Assembly by law. Notwithstanding section 15b, Article V of this Constitution, bills ordering a referendum and bills on which a referendum is ordered are not subject to veto by the Governor.

(bolding added).

Notably, both types of referendum can only be held "on an Act," and any such "Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith" per Art. IV, § 20. Thus, both types of referendum rights reserved to municipalities under Art. IV, § 1(5) incorporate the single-subject protection.

A referral, or legislative referendum, is subject to the single-subject protection per Art. IV, § 20, as well as per the application of the single-subject protection to any "proposed law" under Art. IV, § 1(2)(d). The single-subject protection is directly extended to city referrals via Art. IV, § 1(5), leaving no room for the exception the Commission seeks to establish so it can force voters to approve unpalatable proposals if they want reform.

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d. Defendants' argument that the single-subject protection only applies to initiatives is wrong.

The single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 1(2)(d) is textually located in the constitution among provisions focused on initiatives in Art. IV, § 1(2):

- (2)(a) The people reserve to themselves the initiative power, which is to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and enact or reject them at an election independently of the Legislative Assembly.
- (b) An initiative law may be proposed only by a petition signed by a number of qualified voters equal to six percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the election at which a Governor was elected for a term of four years next preceding the filing of the petition.
- (c) An initiative amendment to the Constitution may be proposed only by a petition signed by a number of qualified voters equal to eight percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the election at which a Governor was elected for a term of four years next preceding the filing of the petition.
- (d) An initiative petition shall include the full text of the proposed law or amendment to the Constitution. A proposed law or amendment to the Constitution shall embrace one subject only and matters properly connected therewith.
- (e) An initiative petition shall be filed not less than four months before the election at which the proposed law or amendment to the Constitution is to be voted upon.
- Art. IV, § 1(2) (emphasis added). However, this textual location does not limit the singlesubject protection to just initiatives for three key reasons.
 - The single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 20 applies to both initiatives and referendum regardless of how the single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 1(2)(d) applies.

The single-subject protection exists in two places. The single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 20 applies to both initiatives and referendum. See Anthony v. Veatch, 189 Or. 462, 501, 220 P.2d 493, 509 (1950) (collecting cases). The language in Art. IV, § 20 does not share similar textual location near initiative provisions like Art. IV, § 1(2)(d). "Although the 1968 amendment made some changes to the number of required signatures and imposed a single subject requirement, it 'did not purport to alter the nature of the

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people's power of initiative and referendum." Harisay, 367 Or. at 124–25 (quoting Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 60, 11 P.3d 228 (2000)). Therefore, the location of Art. IV, § 1(2)(d)'s single-subject protection near provisions focused on initiatives is irrelevant since Art. IV, § 20 applies the single-subject protection to both initiatives and referendum.

> ii. For over a century, Oregon courts have applied the single-subject protection to referendum, mostly to referendum ordered by referral.

In 1920, when considering a referral of a city charter amendment by a city council, the Oregon Supreme Court found that it was "unnecessary to decide whether the [single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 20] of the Constitution . . . is applicable to such proceeding or not" since the referred "act amending the charter of Seaside, embraced but one subject and matters properly connected therewith." Noonan v. City of Seaside, 97 Or. 64, 67–68, 191 P. 651, 652–53 (1920).

In 1924, the Oregon Supreme Court evaluated two different referenda—both ordered by legislative referral—for single-subject compliance. State ex rel. Umatilla Cnty., 110 Or. at 502–03; Putney, 110 Or. at 646–47 (same). In these cases, however, the Court no longer used language reserving the issue like in *Noonan*.

In 1933 the Oregon Supreme Court considered a referral of a city ordinance by a city council, which voters had approved, and found that it only contained a single subject instead of dual subjects. City of Salem v. Oregon-Washington Water Serv. Co., 144 Or. 93, 111–12, 23 P.2d 539, 545 (1933)

In 1950, the Oregon Supreme Court cited several prior cases in noting that the single-subject requirement that applied to initiatives also applied to referenda. Anthony, 189 Or. at 501.

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It is in this context that Oregon voters reorganized the initiative and referendum provisions in 1968, strengthening the single-subject protection by adding it to Art. IV, § 1(2)(d). Importantly, the 1968 change "did not purport to alter the nature of the people's power of initiative and referendum." Harisay, 367 Or. at 124–25 (quoting Stranahan, 331 Or. at 60).

If there was any doubt on whether the single-subject protection still applied to referendum after the 1968 amendment, it was soon removed. In 1975, the Oregon Court of Appeals evaluated a state statute enacted through a referendum ordered by petition for compliance with the single-subject protection. State v. Liles, 22 Or. App. 132, 133–36, 537 P.2d 1182, 1183–84 (1975).⁷

In 1990, the Oregon Supreme Court once again recognized that "Courts have jurisdiction and authority to determine whether a proposed initiative or referendum measure is one of the type authorized by Oregon Constitution, Article IV, section 1(5) to be placed on the ballot." Foster v. Clark, 309 Or. 464, 471, 790 P.2d 1, 5 (1990). The Commission seeks to circumvent these well-established principals, in its effort to "log roll" unpalatable provisions with favored reforms in hopes getting voters desperate for reform to swallow the bad with the good.

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⁷ The opinion in *Liles* notes that the case concerned a referendum but does not specify the type of referendum. The applicable voters' pamphlet for the measure analyzed in the case shows that it is was a referendum ordered by petition. See Oregon Secretary of State, State of Oregon Voters' Pamphlet: General Election, pp. 50-54 (Nov. 5, 1974), available at https://digital.osl.state.or.us/islandora/object/osl%3A64344/datastream/OBJ/view (page 50 notes Measure 13 submitted by referendum petition; compare with page 45 noting that measure 12 referred by legislature).

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iii. The actual wording of the single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 1(2)(d) itself is not limited to initiatives in the city context.

The single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 1(2)(d) applies to any "proposed law." As applied to City municipal legislation under Art. IV, § 1(5), this includes initiatives and both types of referendum, which all are "proposed laws." The textual location of IV, § 1(2)(d) near initiative provisions does not override the meaning of the actual text of the provision itself.

To interpret a constitutional provision, Oregon courts "examine the text, in its historical context and in light of relevant case law, to determine the meaning of the provision at issue most likely understood by those who adopted it, with the ultimate objective of identifying relevant underlying principles that may inform our application of the constitutional text to modern circumstances." Harisay, 367 Or. at 123 (citations omitted). When interpreting "the initiative and referendum power, [courts] consider the meaning understood by the voters when they adopted that power." Id. The 1968 primary voters' pamphlet serves as the best evidence of what the voters understood when the single-subject provision was reiterated in Art. IV, § 1. It demonstrates no intent whatsoever to override decades of cases and limit the pre-existing single-subject protection to just initiatives. Zero. Zilch.

The voters' pamphlet is clear that the primary purpose of the amendment was modifying signature and timeline requirements. These two purposes were the only effects discussed in the ballot title and single argument in favor. Oregon Secretary of State, State of Oregon Voters' Pamphlet: Democratic Party Primary Nominating Election, pp. 9, 11 (May 28, 1968), available at

https://digital.osl.state.or.us/islandora/object/osl%3A955229/datastream/OBJ/view.

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Neither mentioned anything about the reiterated single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 1(2)(d). Id. Neither mentioned anything about narrowing the longstanding single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 20. Id. Neither even mentioned rearranging provisions. Id.

The explanatory statement noted the amendment had three main purposes: (1) modifying signature requirements; (2) rearrangement generally; and (3) modifying deadlines. Under the second purpose, it noted:

... The repeal also would remove archaic and redundant language from existing section 1 a, Article IV, and would combine the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the legal voters of municipalities and districts with the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people of the state. These repealed sections are purely "clean-up" of the wording and in no way do they diminish the power of the people.

Id. at 8 (emphasis added).

By 1968, there had been decades of court cases applying the single-subject protection for referendum, including referrals and for municipal legislation. Cases after 1968 continued this. And, the Oregon Supreme Court has recognized that the 1968 amendments "did not purport to alter the nature of the people's power of initiative and referendum." *Harisay*, 367 Or. at 124–25 (citation omitted).

Defendants effectively argue that, directly contrary to *Harisay*, Oregon voters in 1968 voted to reduce their own choices by ending the single-subject protection for city referendum. And, that voters did this based entirely on textual organization supposedly inconsistent with the plain text application of Art. IV, § 1(2)(d) to every "proposed law." And, that voters intended to override decades of caselaw applying Art. IV, § 20 to referendum and municipal legislation. And, that voters did this without mention of such impacts anywhere in the voters' pamphlet. And, that voters did this despite the voters'

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pamphlet explicitly stating that "in no way do [the changes] diminish the power of the people." Nonsense.

> iv. Armatta does not govern here; that would require reliance on (1) out-of-context quotes (2) from a section of dicta (3) in a partially overturned case (4) that supposedly overturned decades of caselaw (5) without even noting this overruling of prior cases.

Armatta did not consider the issue in the present case—the application of singlesubject protections to referrals for municipal legislation. Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Swett v. Bradbury, 335 Or. 378, 67 P.3d 391 (2003). Nothing in *Armatta* discusses or even mentions the many decades of prior cases recognizing that Art. IV, § 20's single-subject protection applies to referendum, including referendum by referral and municipal legislation. Nothing in Armatta indicates an overruling of such cases. Those prior cases stand and control this case.

The Oregon Supreme Court later noted that *Armatta* stood for "three conclusions:" (1) "the word 'amendment' refers to a specific or particular change to the constitution;" (2) "the separate-vote requirement for initiated laws and constitutional amendments imposes a more restrictive test than the single-subject requirement set out in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), of the Oregon Constitution;" and (3) "although the separatevote requirement is more restrictive than the single-subject requirement, it is not inflexible." Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 341 Or. 496, 504-07, 145 P.3d 151, 155–57 (2006) (quoting multiple passages from *Armatta*). None of these conclusions decide the present case.

Regardless, the dicta discussion in Armatta noted that the single-subject protection does not govern legislative referrals of state constitutional amendments

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because "the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1, imposes a narrower
requirement than does the single-subject requirement of Article IV, section 1(2)(d)."
Armatta, 327 Or. at 276. Thus, to the extent that Defendants or Amicus might
misinterpret out-of-context dicta from Armatta as somehow removing the single-subject
protection from applying to referrals of City charter amendments—which is not one of
the conclusions that Armatta stands for according to Lincoln Interagency Narcotics
<i>Team</i> —then the even higher separate-vote protection would apply.

Several parts of the dicta discussion in *Armatta* reference single-subject requirements in comparison to separate-vote requirements. For example:

In order to fully understand the interplay between the separate-vote and single-subject requirements, it is helpful to determine whether the single-subject requirement pertains only to amendments proposed by initiative, or also to amendments proposed by the legislature under Article XVII, section 1. The answer is not clear from the text of Article IV, section 1(2)(d). However, when viewed in context with the first sentence of subsection (2)(d) and the rest of section 1(2) of Article IV, which pertain only to the initiative process, it appears that the single-subject requirement in Article IV, section 1(2)(d) applies only to "law[s] or amendment[s]" proposed by initiative.

Article IV, section 20, offers further support for that conclusion. It provides, in part:

"Every Act shall embrace but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title." (Emphasis added.)

Because Article IV, section 20, imposes a single-subject requirement upon legislative enactments, it is logical that, as to statutory enactments, the single-subject requirement in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), applies to only laws enacted by initiative. It follows, as a textual matter, that the single-subject requirement in Article IV, section 1(2)(d), applies to only constitutional amendments adopted by initiative, rather than those adopted pursuant to legislative proposal under Article XVII, section 1.

Armatta, 327 Or. at 270–71 (emphasis and brackets in original). If anything, the reasoning in this dicta further supports the application of the single-subject protection in Art. IV, § 20 to the present case, which involves municipal legislation.

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City charter amendments dealing with "laws of general applicability and permanent nature" are "municipal legislation" within the meaning of Art. IV, § 1(5). Beal v. City of Gresham, 166 Or. App. 528, 536–37, 998 P.2d 237, 241–42 (2000); see also State ex rel Dahlen v. Ervin, 158 Or App 253, 257 (1999) (proposed county charter amendment changing "framework within which the county makes siting decisions" was legislation). Thus, even under Armatta, the single-subject protection applies to the Commission's proposed ballot measure.

Further, any other interpretation would contravene the separate-vote protection's furtherance of the longtime "policy of this state that all election laws and procedures shall be established and construed to assist the elector in the exercise of the right of franchise." ORS 247.005. This rule is "pertinent in the construction of these constitutional provisions relating to the 'referendum powers' of the people;" specifically:

Election laws should be liberally construed to the end that the people may have the opportunity of expressing opinion concerning matters of vital interest to their welfare. Expression, not suppression, tends towards good government. The great constitutional privilege of a citizen to exercise his sovereign right to vote should not be taken away by narrow or technical construction. If the statute is of doubtful construction, we think the doubt should be resolved in favor of free expression of opinion.

Multnomah Cnty. v. Mittleman, 275 Or. 545, 558, 552 P.2d 242, 248 (1976) (quoting State ex rel. v. Hoss, 143 Or. 383, 22 P.2d 883 (1933) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Armatta does not support the Commission's effort to create an exception to the singlesubject protection so that it may obtain from the voters what the Commission admits they are likely to reject if presented alone.

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The City Charter's single-subject protection applies in addition to v. the state constitutional single-subject protection.

For the same reasons as already discussed for why Oregon courts have long applied Art. IV, § 20 to state initiatives and referendum, including referendum by referral, the City charter's single-subject protection also applies to all City ballot measures for municipal legislation. The City's own Charter prohibits the Commission's proposal to limit voter choices with an all-or-nothing ballot measure. Portland Charter 2-118. The Commission's efforts to circumvent the City Charter's own single-subject protection should be rejected, and voters allowed to vote for those reforms they value, not those reforms the Commission seeks to force them to accept in an all-or-nothing package.

- 3. The Auditor, as City Elections Officer, has a duty to protect voters through a pre-election review of proposed ballot measures for compliance with singlesubject protections.
 - a. All elections officers have a constitutional duty to protect voters through a pre-election review of proposed ballot measures for compliance with single-subject protections.

For nearly a century, the Oregon Supreme Court has recognized that Portland's Auditor has a duty not to place a proposed measure on the ballot if the proposed measure does not comply with the municipal initiative and referendum protections in Art. IV. Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580, 583, 588, 3 P.2d 778, 779, 781 (1931) (upholding Portland Auditor's decision to reject referendum petition for failure to comply with municipal legislation requirement); Whitbeck v. Funk, 140 Or. 70, 76, 12 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1932) ("The act of the [Portland] auditor in refusing to receive the petition for referendum was proper"); Foster, 309 Or. at 469–71 (proposed City of Portland ballot measure could not appear on ballot due to violating protections in Art. IV, § 1(5)).

There is similar authority for all local election officials. Bowers v. Betschart, 313 Or. App. 294, 311-14, 496 P.3d 1034, 1044-46 (2021), review denied, 369 Or. 504, 506 P.3d 412 (2022) (local elections officer authority); Boytano v. Fritz, 321 Or. 498, 503, 901 P.2d 835, 838 (1995) (city elections officer duty to reject initiatives for procedural constitutional noncompliance); State ex rel. Allen v. Martin, 255 Or. 401, 405–06, 465 P.2d 228, 230 (1970) (recognizing prior cases); Tillamook Peoples' Util. Dist. v. Coates, 174 Or. 476, 486, 149 P.2d 558, 562 (1944) (county clerk may not place a referendum on the ballot if it does not concern municipal legislation). This Court recognized and applied this authority only a few months ago. Dixon v. MacLaren, Multnomah County Circuit Court Case No. 22CV13078, General Judgment (June 10, 2022) and Opinion (May 24, 2022) (Bushong, J.) (upholding Metro's decision to reject initiative that didn't comply with Art. IV, § 1(5)).

There is similar authority for the Secretary of State as the state elections officer.⁸ Oregon Educ. Ass'n v. Roberts, 301 Or. 228, 235, 721 P.2d 833, 836 (1986) (analogous pre-election duty of Secretary of State to reject constitutionally insufficient proposed ballot measures even absent a statute so providing); Geddry v. Richardson, 296 Or. App. 134, 146, 437 P.3d 1163, 1170 (2019) (same); *Harisay*, 367 Or. at 121 (same). ///

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⁸ For decades, the Secretary of State has performed pre-election procedural constitutional 20 review of proposed ballot measures and rejected those that are procedurally constitutionally insufficient based on constitutional authority rather than explicit statutory 21

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Art. XVII and OAR 165-014-0028").

authority. See OAR 165-014-0028 (noting procedural constitutional compliance review for whether proposed ballot measure "embraces one subject only and matters properly

connected therewith" is not a review for "substantive constitutional or legal sufficiency"); OAR 165-014-0005 (adopting State Initiative and Referendum Manual revised 02/2022);

Secretary of State, State Initiative and Referendum, p. 10 (Rev. 02/2022) (citing sources of authority for procedural constitutional review as "Oregon Constitution, Art. IV, §1,

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b. Portland's Auditor has an additional duty under the City charter and code to protect voters through a pre-election review of proposed ballot measures for compliance with single-subject protections.

The City's "City Elections Officer" is the City Auditor or designee. Portland City Code ("PCC") 2.02.010(A), (C) and 2.02.020(A). The Auditor exercises authority independent of other City officers. Portland Charter ("PC") 2-503, The Auditor is responsible for City elections as provided by state law and Chapter 3 of the Charter, as well as for other duties assigned by the Council. PC 2-507(a). The council adopts procedures for conducting elections by ordinance in the City code under Chapter 3 of the Charter. PC 3-106.

Under the Charter, initiative and referendum rights "shall be exercised within the City of Portland in the manner provided by the Constitution and general laws of the State, and ordinances of the City of Portland, enacted in pursuance thereof." PC 3-201. This language continues to mirror what the Charter provided in 1931 when the Oregon Supreme Court found that it incorporated the requirements of Art. IV, § 1 and upheld preelection review. Monahan, 137 Or. at 584 ("Section 19 of the charter of Portland provides that the referendum shall be exercised within the city of Portland in the same manner as provided by the Constitution and general laws of the state and ordinances of the city of Portland enacted in pursuance thereof."). A referendum occurs when a measure is "approved by the electors of the City when submitted under the referendum." PC 3-202.

All documents involving proposed ballot measures, including initiatives and referendum, must be filed with the City Elections Officer. PCC 2.02.010(C). The City Elections Officer "may accept for filing and verify elections documents." PCC

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2.02.010(B). Because the wording is "may accept," not "must accept," the City code anticipates that the City Elections Officer will reject constitutionally defective filings.

Most importantly, the City Elections Officer "shall verify the sufficiency of the content and form of [proposed ballot measure] documents." PCC 2.02.010(D). In contrast, this "review does not include . . . verification that filings are free of substantive legal defects." Id.

The Constitutional and City charter single-subject requirements govern the sufficiency of the content and form of a proposed ballot measure, i.e., the ballot measure's procedural constitutionality, rather than a proposed ballot measure's substantive constitutionality or substantive legal defects.

Similarly, the Secretary of State's analogous procedural constitutional compliance review for whether a proposed ballot measure "embraces one subject only and matters properly connected therewith" is not a review for "substantive constitutional or legal sufficiency." OAR 165-014-0028; see also Geddry, 296 Or. App. at 146.

Although there is a more detailed process in PCC 2.04.055 for pre-election review of City initiatives for constitutional procedural compliance, that code provision does not detract from the general review required by PCC 2.02.010, which also includes referendum and referral. Cf. Monahan, 137 Or. at 583, 588 (upholding Portland Auditor's decision to reject referendum petition for failure to comply with municipal legislation requirement).

When a City elections officer fails their duty, this Court must step in and defend voter rights under the single-subject protection.

This Court has "jurisdiction and authority to determine whether a proposed initiative or referendum measure is one of the type authorized by Oregon Constitution,

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Article IV, section 1(5) to be placed on the ballot." Foster, 309 Or. at 471. Further, since Hoan's voting rights are violated along with all Portland voters, he is a "person adversely affected by any act or failure to act by . . . a city elections officer . . . under any election law, or by any order, rule, directive or instruction made by . . . a city elections officer . . . under any election law." ORS 246.910(1). Thus, Hoan can bring this action to "appeal therefrom to the circuit court for the county in which the act or failure to act occurred or in which the order, rule, directive or instruction was made," which is Multnomah County. *Id.* The court should exercise its jurisdiction and authority to protect voters from being log-rolled by the Commission, assuring voters are able to approve those reforms they want, and reject those they do not.

IV. **CONCLUSION**

For the reasons stated above, the Court should grant summary judgment that Defendants failed to follow their constitutional duty to reject the Commission's proposed ballot measure for violating the single-subject protection. Hoan urges the Court to notify the City of the Court's opinion with all possible haste so that the City has sufficient time to refer the Commission's proposals in multiple single-subject ballot measures. This outcome does the most to protect voter choices, as Oregon's Constitution requires here.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2022.

SHERMAN, SHERMAN, JOHNNIE & HOYT, LLP

s/ Steve Elzinga

Steve Elzinga, OSB No. 123102 Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 27th day of July, 2022, I served or caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following at their last-known addresses as shown below:

Maja K. Haium	Margaret Olney
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Of Attorneys for Defendants	Of Attorneys for Proposed Amicus
	-

- BY REGULAR MAIL: I placed copies of the document(s) in a sealed envelope and caused such envelope to be deposited in the United States Mail at Salem, Oregon, with postage thereon fully prepaid and addressed as listed above.
- BY HAND DELIVERY: I arranged for the documents to be hand delivered to the address(es) listed above.
- \times BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: I served the documents by electronic mail to the electronic mail address(es) listed above.
- BY FACSIMILE: I served the documents by facsimile to the facsimile number(s) listed above.

BY E-FILING USING THE COURT'S ODYSSEY FILE AND SERVE SYSTEM.

SHERMAN, SHERMAN, JOHNNIE & HOYT, LLP

s/ Steve Elzinga

Steve Elzinga, OSB No. 123102 Of Attorneys for Plaintiff

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